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Social Construction of Identities: Pomaks in Bulgaria 
Ali Eminov 
 
Abstract 
 
There is an ongoing debate about whether individual and group identities are fixed and 
resistant to change or fluid, changing according to evaluation by individuals and groups 
of circumstances at a given time and place. This article, by examining the history of 
Pomak identities during the twentieth century, concludes that identities are socially 
constructed through performance, political struggle and compromise. Individuals and 
groups often use identities strategically to adapt to a variety of situations to produce 
and support effective self-concepts. 
 
The point of departure for this article is the disjuncture between those who define ethnic identities 
according to essentialist principles and those whose definitions follow constructionist and/or 
instrumentalist principles. The former insist upon the objective nature of group identities which 
are fixed and resistant to change. The constructivists, on the other hand, examine the specifics of 
ethnicity as an individual choice. Ethnic identities are not fixed but fluid, changing according to 
subjective evaluation by individuals and groups of circumstances at a given time and place. As 
Emile Sahliyeh has observed, an identity “serves the practical needs and interests of the members 
of the community. The durability of [an] identity is contingent upon its ability to provide security, 
social status, and economic benefits for its members more than do other existing alternatives”1.  If 
more appealing alternatives for social and economic advancement are present outside one‟s 
group, then, individuals will take advantage of these alternatives and modify their identity, at 
least temporarily, to suit different conditions. Moreover, members of a given community have 
multiple identities, each activated upon appropriate circumstances. Benedict Anderson has argued 
that nations are “imagined communities” not necessarily based on „objective facts‟ that can be 
traced to a primordial past
2
. Looking at contemporary ethnic identities in the Balkans through the 
prism of essentialism we are likely to distort the contingent nature of identity formation. John 
Fine‟s analysis of medieval and pre-modern sources, for example, has shown the fluidity of 
identity on the territory that is Croatia today. Even at the beginning of the nineteenth century 
most of the people who lived there did not identify themselves as Croatians “but as „Illyrians‟ or 
„Slavs.‟ A number also continued to see themselves as „Dalmatians,‟ and new „Slavonian‟ 
identity was making its appearance in Slavonia. Thus, as we enter the modern period, as far as 
                                                 
1
 Emile Sahliyeh, "Ethnicity and state building: the case of the Palestinians in the Middle East", in Judith T. 
Toland (ed.) Ethnicity and the State (Transaction Publishers, London, 1993), 178. 
2
 Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origins and Spread of Nationalism (Verso 
Books, London, New York, rev. ed. 1991) 
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identity went, there were still many options for people of Slavonia, Croatia and Dalmatia to 
take”3.  An analysis of historical sources for other areas of the Balkans would reveal similar 
processes at work.  
 
This discussion of Pomak identity(ies) will show that claims to a particular identity are not 
primordial or a fixed essence. Identity is malleable and can be reformulated, manipulated and 
changed. According to Tone Bringa, “Different people have different ideas about what decides 
what kind of person one is or what category of people one belongs to.  National or ethnic identity 
is dependent on ascription (i.e. self definition) and description (i.e. definition by others).  People 
locally define and construct their identity according to their own experiences and perceptions, in 
interaction with and in relation to members of neighbouring groups, and in relation to official 
state definitions”4.  Under ordinary circumstances group identity is not problematic. However, 
when powerful groups try to impose a different identity on a victim group and the members of the 
victim group refuse to submit to pressure, group identities become a serious problem to both the 
victim and the victimizer.  Since Pomak identity has been tied to nationalist discourse (especially 
of the romantic kind) since Bulgarian independence from Ottoman rule in 1878, this article also 
spells out the relationship between nationalism and ethnic diversity in a modern nation-state.  
 
Nationalists everywhere consider the existence of multiple ethnic, religious, and linguistic 
minorities within the same state undesirable. To them, cultural diversity is a threat to the stability 
and integrity of the nation-state. Therefore, they seek ways to culturally homogenize the nation so 
that the state and nation come to coincide with one another.    
 
Since Bulgarian independence from Ottoman rule in 1878 political action in Bulgaria has been 
directed toward the creation of a territorially, culturally and linguistically unified nation-state 
predicated upon the elimination of non-Bulgarian minorities through migration (voluntary or 
forced), assimilation (voluntary or forced), and at times, through violence. Bulgarian nationalists, 
like other nationalists in the region, during the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries sought not 
only to liberate their people from Ottoman rule but also to reconstitute their national communities 
within pre-Ottoman medieval imperial borders. Bulgarian nationalists sought the origins of their 
                                                 
3
 John Fine, When Ethnicity Did Not Matter in the Balkans: A Study in Identity in Pre-Nationalist Croatia, 
Dalmatia, and Slavonia in the Medieval and Early-Modern Periods (University of Michigan Press, Ann 
Arbor, 2006), 556. 
4
 Tone Bringa, "Nationality categories, national identification and identity formation in 'multinational' 
Bosnia", 11 The Anthropology of East Europe Review (1993), 70. 
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national community in an imperial medieval past, specifically the First Bulgarian Empire under 
Car Simeon (893-927) when Bulgaria reached its greatest territorial expansion.
5
 Of course, the 
Greek nationalists wanted to reconstitute their nation within the borders of the Byzantine Empire 
at its greatest extent and similarly with other Balkan nationalists. Such ambitions ignored the fact 
that the borders of these early states were impossible to define since they had expanded and 
contracted through time. Since the establishment of Balkan nation-states, serious conflicts over 
borders have periodically turned violent and these conflicts persist to this day.    
 
Moreover, Bulgarian nationalists, contrary to historical evidence, imagined these medieval 
Bulgarian empires to have been ethnically and religiously homogeneous. The new nation-state 
too would restore that assumed ethnic and religious homogeneity.  A strong adherence to this 
mythologized history created insurmountable barriers that did not admit newcomers into the 
nation or the nation-state. Turks, as speakers of a different language, and Muslims (Turks, 
Pomaks and Gypsy Muslims), as carriers of a different religious tradition, posed a serious 
problem to the integrity of the state because their integration and absorption into the majority 
population would be difficult if not impossible. The coercive methods used by the Ţivkov regime 
to absorb these populations into the majority failed and indirectly contributed to the downfall of 
the communist regime in 1989.   
 
The idealization of the pre-Ottoman Bulgarian medieval past was accompanied by the 
demonization of everything Ottoman. To this day most Bulgarians refer to the Ottoman period as 
the darkest period in Bulgarian history, 500 years of „slavery‟ or 500 years “under the yoke” in 
Vazov‟s famous phrase, during which Ottomans are said to have deliberately and methodically 
destroyed Bulgarian culture, forced Bulgarians to convert to Islam and Turkified them (Snegarov, 
1958, for example). After Bulgarian independence from Ottoman rule, the question became, what 
was to become of the Turks and other Muslims that remained within the borders of Bulgaria? 
What was to be done with the reminders of Ottoman rule in Bulgarian culture and Bulgarian 
                                                 
5
 Bulgaria came close to this ideal in the Treaty of San Stefano signed on 3 March 1878 between Russia 
and the Ottoman Empire, which created a large autonomous Bulgarian Princedom that included most of the 
areas claimed as historic Bulgarian lands. Western powers did not want a large Bulgarian state friendly to 
Russia in the Balkans and quickly proceeded to dismember it during the same year at the Congress of 
Berlin. What emerged from the Congress of Berlin was a small vassal principality north of the Balkan 
mountains plus the eyalet of Sofia.  As Richard Crampton has observed, “For every Bulgarian, however, 
the real Bulgaria remained that of San Stefano. The new Bulgarian state was to enter into life with a ready-
made programme of territorial expansion and a burning sense of injustice meted out to it by the great 
powers” (Richard Crampton, A Concise History of Bulgaria (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 
1997), 85. From then on Bulgaria would use every opportunity to regain the territories lost at the Congress 
of Berlin and each attempt would end in failure and loss.   
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landscape? The answer was to cast aside and eliminate these reminders. Ottoman dress, housing 
styles, urban layouts, architectural monuments, and place names had to go.
6
 As Stephen Lewis 
notes, “hostility to history and place names is only one step away from hostility to people” 
(Lewis, 1998), and in one way or another non-Bulgarians and the non-Orthodox had to go too.   
 
The leaders of nation-states in the Balkans have used various strategies to achieve cultural 
homogeneity. They have often tried to maintain the illusion of cultural homogeneity by denying 
the existence of ethnic or religious minorities within their borders.
7
 Even when the existence of 
minorities was recognized, citizenship in a nation-state did not necessarily entitle members of 
minority groups to full human rights. They were discriminated against in various ways. 
Minorities were often used by nation-states as pawns in their internal and international relations. 
Also, nationalist leaders have exploited minority groups to promote national self-interest or the 
interests of particular political factions or to further their own political power and personal 
ambitions. Not infrequently, attempts at absorption of minority groups into the majority through 
acculturation or assimilation and/or attempts to persuade members of minority groups to emigrate 
have turned violent, at times even genocidal. Recent ethnic cleansings in Bosnia and Kosovo are 
the latest examples of recurring ethnic cleansings of Muslims in the Balkans dating back to the 
mid-nineteenth century
8
.         
 
For most of the twentieth century, Bulgarian ideologues have used essentialist notions in their 
attempt to create a homogenized nation: that everyone in Bulgaria should belong to one nation, 
with one language, one religion, and one set of cultural traditions. The Bulgarian nation was 
imagined to have been formed during the ninth and tenth centuries from a blending of Slavs, 
Thracians, and Asiatic tribes and to have remained „pure‟ since its formation. There is no reliable 
historical evidence to support the claim that Bulgarian ethnogenesis was completed by the end of 
the tenth century. We can not even speak of a fully formed Bulgarian identity at the beginning of 
the nineteenth century. Nevertheless lack of evidence did not stop many Bulgarian scholars from 
                                                 
6
 Petŭr  Koledarov and Nikolaj Mičev provide a comprehensive list of place names that were changed 
between 1878 and 1987 (Petŭr Koledarov and Nikolaj Mičev, Promenite v Imenata i Statuta na Selištata v 
Bǔlgaria, 1878-1972 (Nauka i Izkustvo, Sofia, 1973; Nikolaj Mičev and Petŭr Koledarov, Rečnik na 
Selištata: Selištnite Imena v Bǔlgaria, 1878-1987  (Nauka i Izkustvo, Sofia,1989).  
7
 Between 1985 and 1989 the Bulgarian government maintained that there were no Turks in Bulgaria.  
According to government officials, Bulgaria had achieved a historic reunification of all Bulgarian citizens 
into a single Bulgarian nation.    
8
 Justin McCarthy, Death and Exile: The Ethnic Cleansing of Ottoman Muslims, 1821-1922 (Princeton 
University Press, Princeton, 1995). 
JEMIE 6 (2007) 2 © 2007 by European Centre for Minority Issues 5  
insisting on the ancient origins of the Bulgarian nation.  
 
Two defining characteristics of this nation were the Bulgarian language and Orthodox 
Christianity. Although it was possible to impose a different religious identity (Islam) or a 
different language and ethnic identity (Turkish) on the members of this imagined nation, deep 
down they remained Bulgarians.  State policies could help these people to recover their Bulgarian 
identity so that the Muslim Bulgarians (Pomaks) would once again have Bulgarian names, give 
up their Islamic beliefs and practices, replace them with Christian beliefs and practices (pre-1944 
and post-1989), or under communism, replace their Islamic beliefs and practices with Bulgarian 
„socialist‟ ones.9 To change the ethnic and religious consciousness of Pomaks, Turks, and Roma 
(Gypsy) Muslims, Bulgarian governments launched several campaigns of assimilation against 
these populations during the twentieth century.
10
    
 
This article assumes that claims to a particular identity are malleable, open to modification, 
reformulation and replacement “within the context of opportunity, constraint and power”11. 
Identities are socially constructed through performance, political struggle and compromise. They 
may be used as strategies by which to adapt to a variety of social situations and to produce and 
support effective self-concepts. The durability of an identity is therefore contingent upon its 
ability to provide security, social status, and economic benefits for its members. If there are more 
attractive alternatives, then individuals may take advantage of these alternatives by modifying, 
even changing, their identity.    
 
                                                 
9
 Mary Neuburger provides a detailed discussion of state policies aimed at management, modification or 
elimination of markers of identity between Pomaks and Bulgarians in order to create a unified Bulgarian 
nation and to validate Bulgaria‟s claim to modernity and Europeanness and to cast off the orientalist label 
which Bulgarians felt had been unfairly imposed on them by the West (Mary Neuburger, The Orient 
Within: Muslim Minorities and the Negotiation of Nationhood in Modern Bulgaria (Cornell University 
Press, Ithaca, 2004). 
10
 In the 1980s, the essentialist notion that „Once a Bulgarian, always a Bulgarian,‟ was extended to the 
members of the Turkish minority in Bulgaria. On the grounds that they had once been Bulgarians who had 
been forced to convert to Islam by the Ottomans, they were forced to replace their Turkish names with 
Bulgarian ones, prohibited from speaking Turkish in public, pressured to give up their cultural and religious 
practices or replace them with „socialist‟ ones. A campaign was launched to eradicate most reminders of 
Ottoman architectural presence from the Bulgarian landscape. No credible claims could be made about the 
Bulgarian origins of the Gypsies (Roma). Consequently, the word „Gypsy‟ disappeared from official 
discourse. In large cities such as Sofia, Gypsy neighborhoods were surrounded by high walls to shield them 
from the eyes of tourists and diplomats.     
11
 Bette Denich, "Unmaking Multi-ethnicity in Yugoslavia: Metamorphosis Observed", 11 The 
Anthropology of East Europe Review (1993), 44. 
JEMIE 6 (2007) 2 © 2007 by European Centre for Minority Issues 6  
How do members of minority communities respond to attempts by government officials or 
outsiders who try to manipulate their identity? This article focuses on Bulgarian-speaking 
Muslims (Pomaks) in Bulgaria and examines the strategies they have used in response to 
pressures from the government as well as pressures from their Bulgarian and Turkish neighbours 
to alter their identity.
12
 
 
Hugh Poulton defines Pomaks as “Slavic Bulgarians who speak Bulgarian as their mother tongue, 
but whose religion and customs are Islamic”13.  People who have no ideological axe to grind 
generally agree with this definition. In Bulgaria, Pomaks represent one of three major Muslim 
groups. The other two are Turkish and Roma Muslims. According to the results of the 2001 
census, there were 996,978 Muslims in Bulgaria, making up 12.2% of the Bulgarian population.  
Muslims were concentrated in the southeastern and northeastern regions of the country.  The 
2001 census results show that Muslims were in the majority in two districts: in Kŭrdţali in 
southeastern Bulgaria with 69.6% and in Razgrad, northeastern Bulgaria, with 53.7% of the 
district population. In the districts of Tŭrgovište, Smoljan, Sliven, Šumen, Blagoevgrad, Ruse, 
Burgas, Pazardţik, and Xaskovo, Muslims made up more than 10% of the population (Table 1). 
Out of 262 municipalities in the country Muslims were in the majority in 43 municipalities. 
Between the 1992 and 2001 censuses the number of Muslims in Bulgaria declined by 143,317, 
from 1,110,295 in 1992 to 966,978 8 in 2001. This decline was largely due to emigration to 
Turkey and other countries in search of jobs and a better life. The greatest decline in the number 
of Muslims occurred in the district of Smoljan, a predominantly Pomak district, from 87,834 or 
55% of the district population in 1992, to 58,758 or 41.9% in 2001
14
. This decline can be 
attributed not only to emigration but also to the considerable success of Christian missionaries in 
converting Pomaks to Orthodox and other branches of Christianity since 1989. The success of 
                                                 
12
 Although the word „Pomak‟ has negative connotations, Pomak (Pomaci), or Bulgarian Mohamedans 
(Bŭlgaro-Moxamedani, Bŭlgaromoxamedani) are the most frequently used ascriptive designations by 
scholars and journalists. Their Turkish and Bulgarian neighbors also used the word „Pomak‟ in referring to 
this population. Kamen Burov, the founder of a Pomak party in 1993, the Democratic Labor Party, in an 
attempt to free the word „Pomak‟ from its negative connotations, has lobbied for the recognition of a 
Pomak ethnic minority in Bulgaria. To date, his party and his ideas have gained few followers among the 
Pomak population. Most Pomaks prefer „Mohamedans (Moxamedani) or „Muslims‟ (Mjuslumani) as self-
ascriptive terms. However, there is no consensus on these terms either. Depending on the situation, they 
may identify themselves as Pomaks, Muslims, Bulgarians, Turks, etc.  
13
 Hugh Poulton, The Balkans: Minorities and States in Conflict (Minority Rights Group Publications, 
London, New ed. 1993), 111. 
14
 Nacionalen Statističeski Institut, Demografska Xarakteristika na Bǔlgarija (rezultati ot 2% izvadka). 
Prebrojavane na Naselenieto i  Žilištnija Fond kǔm 4 Dekemvri 1992 g. Sofia (Sofia, 1993); National 
Statistical Institute, Census 2001 – Final Results. Available at, www.nsi.bg/census_e/census_e.htm, Access 
date: July 1, 2007. 
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missionaries representing evangelical Protestant denominations in converting Pomaks and 
Gypsies is indicated in almost doubling the numbers of Protestants in Bulgaria between 1989 and 
2001.  Protestants are the only group that increased in number during this time.   
        
The Pomaks live in compact settlements in the central and western Rhodope Mountains of 
southern Bulgaria, from the Mesta River Valley in the west to the Xaskovo-Kŭrdţali line in the 
east, in Western Thrace of northern Greece, throughout Macedonia, eastern Albania and in 
Turkey. Estimating the number of Pomaks in these countries is difficult because in national 
censuses they have been counted either as members of the majority ethnic group or under the 
general category of Muslims.
15
 In Bulgaria, estimates provided by knowledgeable scholars vary 
from a low of 80,000 to a high of 269,000
16
 .  Other estimates fall between these numbers. In the 
1992 census, some 164,000 Muslims identified their mother tongue as Bulgarian.  However, the 
ethnic identity of these Bulgarian-speaking Muslims was problematic, some identifying 
themselves as Bulgarians, others as Bulgarian Muslims, and still others as Turks. According to 
the census results of 2001, 131,531 ethnic Bulgarians choose their religious affiliation as Muslim 
(NSI, Census, 2001). The number of Pomaks in Greece and Macedonia has been estimated at 
around 40,000 and in Albania at between 80,000 and 120,000
17
. In Turkey Pomaks have largely 
been assimilated into the majority culture.  
 
The unofficial 1989 statistics of the Ministry of the Interior and local officials provide a good 
illustration of the territorial distribution of the Pomak population in Bulgaria (Table 2). The great 
majority lived in the Rhodopes, primarily in the districts of Smoljan and Kŭrdţali, in the Mesta 
River Valley of the district of Blagoevgrad, and in the southern mountain regions of the district of 
                                                 
15
 Prior to the 1992 census in Bulgaria there was heated debate over the inclusion of questions on ethnic 
affiliation, mother tongue, and religious affiliation on census forms. Results of the census also proved 
controversial. Nationalist groups claimed that over 25,000 Bulgarian-speaking Muslims (Pomaks) in the 
municipalities of Jakoruda, Satovča, Gǔrmen, and Goce Delčev have been pressured by the representatives 
of the Movement for Rights and Freedoms to declare their ethnic affiliation as Turkish (Rada Nikolaev, 
"Bulgaria‟s 1992 Census: results, problems, and implications", 2 RFE/RL Research Reports (1993), 60.  
A parliamentary commission assigned to investigate the matter found no evidence of  pressure on Pomaks 
to declare their ethnic affiliation one way or another. Nevertheless, in 1993 a legislative commission 
decided to annul the census results on ethnic criteria for the Jakoruda and Goce Delčev municipalities on 
the grounds that the people in question were Bulgarians, not Turks. When the final results of the 1992 
census were published in 1994, the number of Turks in Bulgaria was revised downward (Nacionalen 
Statističeski Institut, 1993, 1994). 
16
 Nikolaj Vrančev, Bǔlgari Moxamedani (Pomaci) (Biblioteka Bǔlgarski Narod, Sofia, 1948, 17; Yulian 
Konstantinov, Gulbrand Alhaug, and Birgit Igla, "Names of the Bulgarian Pomaks", 17 Nordlyd: Tromso 
University Working Papers on Language and Linguistics (1991), 103-105. 
17
 Mario Apostolov, "The Pomaks: A Religious Minority in the Balkans", 24 Nationalities Papers (1996), 
728-729. 
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Pazardţik. In 1989 they constituted the majority of the population only in the district of Smoljan 
with over 70%. Since then, their numbers in this district have steadily declined to 55% in 1992 
and to 41.9% in 2001, primarily due to migration and conversion to Christianity.   
  
In addition to the Rhodopes region there were small groups of Pomaks living in the villages of 
Galata, Glogovo, Gradešnitsa and Babinci of the Loveč-Teteven region north of the Balkan 
range
18
. A smaller group inhabits several villages near the towns of Elena, Zlataritsa, and Veliko 
Tŭrnovo. These groups represent Pomaks and their descendants who were removed from their 
villages near the Bulgarian-Greek border by the Ministry of Internal Affairs between 1948 and 
1951 and resettled in northern Bulgaria.
19
  There are scattered Pomak enclaves in the districts of 
Burgas, Šumen, Razgrad, Tŭrgovište, and Stara Zagora in areas of compact Turkish settlement.    
 
Traditionally, in Bulgaria, the Pomaks were stockbreeders and agriculturalists.  Under communist 
rule the transhumant nomads were settled down and many came to specialize in tobacco farming 
and in construction and mining trades as the state undertook an aggressive industrialization 
program. Today, with the collapse of the construction and mining sectors of the economy in the 
Rhodopes, a process of deindustrialization is under way, forcing some Pomaks back to traditional 
agriculture and stock breeding, while many are leaving their villages in search of jobs elsewhere, 
including abroad.    
 
Historically, Bulgaria, Greece, and Turkey have contested the identity of Pomaks, each country 
claiming them as their own. Greek historians consider the Pomaks as the descendants of ancient 
Thracian tribes who, over the centuries “were Hellenized, Latinized (Romanized), Slavicized, 
Christianized, and were converted to Islam”20. Greek historians have also pointed to some ancient 
Greek words preserved in their language as proof of their Hellenic origin, while conveniently 
forgetting that today they speak a dialect of Bulgarian, which contains many Turkish words. 
                                                 
18
 Bernard Lory, "Une communaute musulmane oubliee: les Pomaks de Lovec", 19 Turcica : Revue 
d’Etudes Turques (1987), 117. 
19
 After World War II, the communist government wanted to secure the Bulgarian-Greek border by 
removing what it considered to be troublesome villagers from the border area to the interior of the country.  
After the establishment of the Greek-Bulgarian frontier following the Balkan Wars, sheep herders in border 
areas had continued to move across the border with their flocks during their seasonal migrations; relatives 
who had been separated by the border also continued to cross the border for visits. Pomaks living close to 
the border were accused of espionage and sabotage, and of being unreliable people. Communist authorities 
felt it was necessary to resettle these suspect people in the interior of the country in order to maintain the 
integrity of the frontier.    
20
 Tatjana Seyppel, "The Pomaks of Northeastern Greece: an endangered Balkan population", 10 Journal of 
Institute of Muslim Minority Affairs (1989), 42. 
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Greeks along with Bulgarians also point out to their physical features, predominance of fair skin 
and blue eyes, as proof of their Greek or Bulgarian origin.    
 
Most Bulgarian scholars have mainly used linguistic evidence to claim them as their own. Since 
Pomaks speak a Bulgarian dialect with numerous ancient Bulgarian constructions, it is argued 
that they must be of Bulgarian origin. They are Muslim today only because they were forced to 
convert to Islam sometime during the seventeenth century. Bulgarian scholars have also pointed 
to what they call „Christian‟ and „pre-Christian‟ features in their culture to support the 
Bulgarian/Christian origin of this population
21
.    
 
Turkish scholars have dispensed with linguistic and cultural arguments and have emphasized the 
religious affiliation of Pomaks. They are Muslims; therefore they must be of Turkish origin. 
These scholars trace the origins of Pomaks to the descendants of various Turkic peoples who had 
settled in the Balkans and had converted to Islam long before the Ottoman conquests in the area. 
When Ottoman conquerors started moving into the Balkans beginning in the mid-fourteenth 
century they found a sympathetic Muslim population ready and willing to help them. For this 
their Bulgarian Christian neighbours called them „pomagač‟ or „helper‟ or collaborator‟ (of the 
Turks). This word was later shortened to „Pomak.‟22 Thus, according to Turkish scholars, Pomaks 
and Turks are not only related by religion, but Pomaks are „pure-blooded‟ Turks, representing the 
oldest Turkish population in Europe
23
.   
 
Even though in Bulgaria linguistic evidence was used to support the Bulgarian origin of Pomaks, 
for decades after Bulgarian independence from Ottoman rule in 1878, the Pomaks were alienated 
and marginalized. The new nation-state made no effort to integrate the Pomaks into Bulgarian 
society. Instead, Pomaks were treated as part of the larger Muslim group in the country. In early 
censuses they were identified as Turks, encouraged to emigrate to Turkey, or to assimilate into 
the Bulgarian majority by converting to Orthodox Christianity. It was only during the 1920s, and 
especially the 1930s, that Pomaks were officially identified as Bulgarians and “a sustained 
campaign began in the press urging public opinion to discriminate between religious and ethnic 
                                                 
21
 Carol Silverman, "Pomaks", in R. Weekes (ed.) Moslem Peoples: A World Ethnographic Survey 
(Greenwood Press, Westport, 2.ed. 1989), 614. 
22
 Maria Todorova provides additional probable derivations of the word „Pomak‟ as well as other 
designations used by non-Pomaks to describe this population (Todorova, 1998, p.p. 480-481).      
23
 Seyppel, The Pomaks…, 43; See especially Hüseyin Memişoğlu, Pages of the History of Pomak Turks 
(H. Memişoğlu, Ankara, 1991); Hüseyin Memişoğlu, Balkanlarda Pomak Türkleri: Türk Dünvasi 
Araştirmalari Vakfi (Istanbul, 1999). 
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allegiance and to accept Pomaks as part of the Bulgarian nation”24. The distinction between 
religious and ethnic allegiance, and the acceptance of Pomaks as part of the Bulgarian nation was 
slow in coming. Čičovski, writing about Pomaks in 1934, accuses the Bulgarian authorities of not 
being able “to make a difference between Turks and Bulgarian Mohammedans. We regard them 
as Turks because of their religion and often hate them. We persecute them.  In their willingness to 
buy their property for nothing, crafty speculators make every effort to fan our hatred towards 
them, to discredit them so as to achieve their emigration”25.   
  
A relatively successful effort to replace, or at least subordinate, Ottoman derived dominant 
religious identity among Pomaks by a language-based identity promoted by the Bulgarian nation-
state was undertaken by the Rodina (Motherland) movement during the late 1930s and early 
1940s. Between 1937 and 1944, it “introduced Bulgarian language worship in the mosques, 
translated the Qur’an into Bulgarian, created a Bulgarian Muslim establishment separate from the 
Turkish, and promoted the creation of a local elite by enrolling Bulgarian Muslims into secondary 
and higher education establishments”26. Unfortunately, this program to promote Bulgarian 
ethnic/national consciousness among Pomaks also involved efforts to eliminate the wearing of 
traditional clothes, especially by Pomak women, and changing the Muslim names of Pomaks to 
Bulgarian.  Between 1942 and 1944 some two-thirds of Pomaks living in the central Rhodopes 
changed their names. The questionable tactics used in these efforts generated considerable 
resistance toward the Rodina movement. When the Communist party came to power in Bulgaria 
after World War II, Rodina was branded as a reactionary nationalist organization and dissolved. 
The Muslim names of Pomaks were restored by 1945. Unfortunately for the Pomaks, the 
communist regime would resort to the same questionable tactics and worse in its efforts to 
assimilate them into the majority population during the 1960s and 1970s.    
 
Depending on the ideology of political leaders, at times the Pomaks have been allowed to 
maintain their religious identity unhindered, while at other times authorities have attempted to 
assimilate them into the majority Bulgarian culture by forcing them to replace their Muslim 
names with Bulgarian names, renounce their Islamic faith and convert to Christianity. Four times 
                                                 
24
 Maria Todorova, "Identity (trans)formation among Pomaks in Bulgaria", in Beverly Crawford and 
Ronnie D. Lipschutz (eds.) The Myth of 'Ethnic Conflict': Politics, Economics and 'Cultural' Violence 
(University of California International and Area Studies Digital Collection, 1998), 476. 
25
 Cited in Krastjo Mancev, "National Problem in the Balkans until the Second World War", in Krastjo 
Mancev, Zhortheta Chakuorva and Boby Bobev (eds.) National Problems in the Balkans (Arges Publishing 
House, Sofia, 1992), 37. 
26
 Todorova, "Identity (transformation)"…, 476 
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during the twentieth century (1912, 1942, 1962, and 1971-74) they were forced to change their 
names, and four times (1913, 1945, 1964 [partial restoration], and 1990), they were allowed to 
reclaim their Muslim names
27
. The name changing campaigns of 1912 and 1942 were also 
marked by intense Bulgarian Orthodox missionary pressure to convert them to Christianity.  
Similar pressures reemerged after the fall of communism. This time, in addition to Orthodox 
missionaries, every imaginable Christian group has entered the fray to save Pomak souls.
28
    
 
After World War II the Bulgarian origin of Pomaks gained official support.  Now they were 
considered Bulgarians, “flesh of the flesh and blood of the blood” of the Bulgarian nation. Many 
Bulgarian scholars and ideologues insisted that Pomaks were Bulgarians, not only because they 
spoke Bulgarian but also because they were said to have preserved Bulgarian language and 
culture in a „purer‟ form and substance than other Bulgarians29. Therefore, they should have 
Bulgarian names and replace their Islamic beliefs and practices with socialist beliefs and 
practices. They are Muslim today, they insisted, only because they were forced to convert to 
Islam by Ottoman Turks. Bulgarian scholars generally ignored the ideas of Pomaks themselves 
about their origins and history. The Pomaks have had to react to externally imposed notions about 
their identity and history, notions that have changed according to the whims of different 
governments in power over the years.  
 
After 1948, repeated attempts were made “to induce Pomaks to change their names, renounce 
their faith and become integrated into the socialist Bulgarian state”30.  Some Pomaks, who 
resisted the initial campaign (1948-1952), were resettled to other areas of Bulgaria, far away from 
their natal communities. As Pomaks came under increasing assimilatory pressure, many among 
them began to identify themselves as Turks in an attempt to preserve their Muslim identity. The 
government saw this „Turkification‟ process as a mortal danger to their goal of establishing a 
single-nation state.  After the April 1956 Plenum of the Communist Party, steps were taken to 
counteract this alarming trend among Pomaks (as well as Roma Muslims and Tatars).  The 
                                                 
27
 Yulian Konstantinov, "An Account of Pomak Conversions (1912-1990)", in Gerhard Seewann (ed.) 
Minderheitenfragen in Südosteuropa (Südost-Institut, R. Oldenburg Verlag, München 1992). 
28
Some in Bulgaria have long argued that complete blending of Pomaks with the Bulgarian majority is only 
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Muslims to Orthodox Christianity. Father Sariev, the leader of a grassroots Christianization movement in 
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 Seyppel, The Pomaks…, 42. 
30
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Politburo charged the Bulgarian Academy of Sciences (BAS) to undertake wide-ranging studies 
to discover “the historical truth about the results of the assimilation policies of the Turkish 
oppressors, about the mass and individual conversions to Islam”31. An interdisciplinary 
expedition was organized by the BAS and sent to the Rhodopes to study the historic past of 
Pomaks and to establish their Bulgarian origins. The findings of this expedition were published in 
1958
32
.    
 
In April 1962 the Politburo approved “Measures Against the Self-Identification of Gypsies, 
Tatars, and Bulgarians Professing the Mohamedan Religion.” These „Measures‟ included 
expediting change of names from Turko-Arabic to Bulgarian; making sure that Pomak children 
are taught only in Bulgarian, avoiding the appointment of Turkish teachers in schools in which 
Pomak students predominated, not assigning Pomak and Turkish children to the same hostels or 
study groups, not appointing Turkish clergymen to Pomak villages, and so on
33
.  
 
 Soon afterward, part of the Pomak population was forced to replace their Muslim names with 
Bulgarian ones and pressured to give up their Muslim beliefs and practices.  Resistance to the 
assimilation campaign was brutally put down. On 12 May 1964, the Politburo issued a directive 
entitled “Work among the Bulgarian Mohamedan Population in the Blagoevgrad District and its 
Abuses.” This directive strongly condemned the over-zealousness of local party officials in 
carrying out the name-changing campaign and the Muslim names of Pomaks were partially 
restored. However, several years later, on 17 July 1970, the Politburo again reconfirmed the 
necessity of “changing Turkish-Arab names and dress” of the Bulgarian Muslim population34. 
This directive was carried out between 1971 and 1973 when all of the Pomaks were forced to 
adopt Bulgarian names. The official explanation was that “the Bulgarian Mohamedan (the 
prescribed reference to the Pomak) was given the opportunity to regain his/her original Bulgarian 
identity. The Mohamedan was expected to embrace that chance with gratitude and henceforth 
proceed in life as a member of the Bulgarian community”35. During the campaign, scores were 
killed, hundreds were arrested and sentenced to long years of hard labour. It was only after 1989 
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 Theodore Zang and Lois Whitman, "Destroying Ethnic Identity: The Gypsies of Bulgaria", Helsinki 
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34
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35
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JEMIE 6 (2007) 2 © 2007 by European Centre for Minority Issues 13  
that the Pomaks would once more be allowed to freely choose their names.      
 
The emphasis on changing the names of Pomaks and other Muslims and the extraordinary steps 
taken to accomplish it make sense within the Balkan context. As Neuburger has observed,   
 
In the Balkan context, where there is no visible racial/color difference  
between Christian and Muslim, names are one of the primary  
indicators of ethno-religious affiliation.  Names, like the turban,  
fez and veil, are obtrusive markers of Muslim belonging. . . As  
with Muslim-style dress, Turco-Arabic names became explicit targets  
of twentieth century Bulgarian crusades to control their Muslim  
provinces and, ultimately, to remake Muslims in their own image. . .  
In turn, Muslim attachment to names ran as deep as the Bulgarian fixation  
with changing them
36
. 
 
For the Pomaks the consequences of these name-changing crusades have been profound. As 
Tatjana Seypel has noted, several name-changing campaigns “have driven the Pomaks into a state 
of confusion in respect to their identity. The question put to them: „Who are you?‟ forces them to 
all kinds of reactions, to taking this or that position . . . to either resistance or opportunism, 
depending on the assumed purpose of the question or the questioner”37.  Yulian Konstantinov et 
al. have noted that, because of several historic „interruptions‟ in their lives during the twentieth 
century, it is almost “impossible to penetrate into Pomak identity and its way of thinking . . . 
When they are asked as to their identity, Pomaks practically always tend to hesitate. Some people 
prefer to utter the word „Pomak‟ only in a subdued manner, just like the word „Gypsy‟ or „Jew‟ 
elsewhere”38.  While Bulgarians answer questions about their identity in an unambiguous and 
straightforward fashion, Pomaks always hesitate.  Konstantinov et al. find a two level identity 
structure among Pomaks, a religious orientation level and an ethnic orientation level (see Figure 
1)
39
. Which of these levels will be activated at any given time depends on social context.  
 
According to Konstantinov et al., “In formal, out-group contexts -- such as an official  
                                                 
36
 Neuburger, The Orient Within…, 143. 
37
 Seyppel, The Pomaks…, 43. 
38
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39
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FIGURE 1.  TWO-LEVEL IDENTITY STRUCTURE AMONG POMAKS  
   POMAKS  TURKS  BULGARIANS 
First (Islamic)  Pomak = Muslim Turk = Muslim      Bulgarian = non- 
level         Muslim 
 
Second (ethnic)  Pomak = „not pure‟ Turk   Bulgarian 
level   Turk 
  
 
discussion of identity problems at a meeting, when reading and discussing what the papers report 
about the issue, or in conversation with Bulgarians -- the religious level seems to be activated”40. 
Traditionally, Pomaks have found it difficult to identify themselves as Bulgarians, because, as the 
figure above suggests, being Bulgarian implies that Pomaks are not Muslim.
41
 “An „ethnic‟ 
interpretation of the identity issue is only possible therefore in an in-group context of discussion, 
but even then, it has to be borne in mind, a popular description such as „not pure Turk‟ does not 
automatically lead to identifying with the Bulgarian majority.”42 The Bulgarian and Turkish 
neighbours of Pomaks have their own notions about Pomak identity, notions that are not helpful 
to Pomaks at all. As Magdalena Elchinova has noted, “Christians say: „Yes, they are Bulgarians 
but not exactly.‟  Turks state: „Pomaks are Muslims but not as true as we are.‟  So an existential 
question for the Pomaks becomes „Then who and what are we?‟”43.    
 
Other authors suggest that Pomak identity is indeed more complex than the above. According to 
Mario Apostolov, there are three or more levels of Pomak identity: “a Pomak as a member of a 
small community, a Muslim as a member of a universal Islamic community, the umma, or a 
Bulgarian on the basis of his language or citizenship if he lives in Bulgaria . . . On another level 
one may demonstrate Turkish, Albanian or Macedonian identity which may not correspond to the 
                                                 
40
 Ibid. 
41
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 See footnote 39; The self-ascriptive designation „not pure Turk‟ refers to individuals who claim to be 
ethnically Turkish but speak Bulgarian as their mother tongue. However, they insist that their ancestors 
spoke Turkish as their mother tongue before the areas where they lived were incorporated into Bulgaria in 
1912. Once part of Bulgaria they were required to speak Bulgarian only. 
43
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linguistic one”44.  Evangelos Karagiannis identifies six options of identity that Pomaks may 
exercise depending on the situation. These include three assimilation options: Christian 
Bulgarian, secular Bulgarian, secular Pomak, and three dissimilation options: Bulgarian 
Mohammedan, Muslim Pomak, and Turkish
45
.  More recently another option has emerged among 
the Pomak population as Pomak cultural identity has become politicized, a political Pomak 
option.  As Karagiannis has written, “such a political articulation may not be connected with a 
specific ethnic self-perception, but, due to its integrating demand as well as its attempt to remove 
Pomak ethnicity from its position of marginality, and place the Pomak issue on the political 
agenda, is worthy of separate contemplation.”46 Today the mobilization of the Pomak population 
for political action stresses not identity issues but economic concerns that they share with other 
minority populations. If a group/party is perceived to be strong and as having financial backing 
from outside of Bulgaria, Pomaks may not only support such a group/party politically but may 
also modify or change their identity to that of the members of the group/party they support.      
 
Notions of Pomak identity are also influenced by the identity of their neighbours.  Tomova has 
written that “In the Western Rhodopes, where Bulgarian Muslims live among Bulgarian 
Christians, they refer to themselves as Turks; in the Eastern Rhodopes, where they are surrounded 
by Turks, they stress their identity as Bulgarians”47.  When Pomaks who don‟t speak Turkish but 
claim Turkish identity are pressed to explain, they invoke their own version of their history, 
which is at odds with the official version. This parochial version is based partly on myths and 
partly on historical truth and goes something like this:  
 
The Pomaks lived for centuries in the Rhodopes and Southern Thrace.   
When the Bulgarians overran those regions in 1912 [the First Balkan  
War] their Bulgarian priests made us give up our language [Turkish]  
and [Turco-Arabic] names, but we did not give up our religion. The 
Bulgarians have been trying to do that ever since, but with no success
48
.   
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Or they may assert that the language a person speaks does not necessarily predict the ethnic 
identity of a person or his/her descendants. Moreover, what is important for Muslims, they say, is 
not the language they speak but their Islamic faith. Regardless of their ethnic background, they 
are all Muslims and there are no differences between Muslims.   
  
There is much more behind the choice of Turkish ethnicity by some Pomaks than the claim that 
they were once Turkish speakers; that Bulgarian language was imposed on them by Bulgarian 
authorities when their villages were incorporated into Bulgaria after the Balkan wars. The main 
premise of this article is that people choose between alternative identities in terms of the extent to 
which a particular identity serves the practical needs and interests of the individuals or groups. 
Some Pomaks, by choosing Turkish ethnic identity, make an emphatic statement that, even 
though they speak Bulgarian, they are not ethnically Bulgarian. This is a response to the kind of 
negative treatment they have received at the hands of Bulgarians in the past and an attempt to 
avoid similar treatment in the future. Moreover, choosing Turkish ethnic identity makes them 
members of the largest minority community in the country, whose interests are represented by a 
powerful political party, the Movement for Rights and Freedoms (MRF), with representatives in 
Parliament.
49
 The support of the MRF among Pomaks who identify themselves as Turks is also 
based on the perception that the MRF, with the help of Turkey, is in a position to solve their 
economic and social problems. Of course, those who claim Turkish identity comply with the 
provisions of the emigration agreement with Turkey. Emigration to Turkey can be a safety valve 
for Pomaks with Turkish ethnic identity.    
 
These Pomaks, by choosing Turkish identity, are trying to escape or transcend one version of 
history, nationality, and language imposed on them by the majority by insisting that identities are 
created as much as they are inherited; that identities are not primordial, carried in the „blood,‟ but 
can be consciously chosen. As Michael Ignatieff has noted, however, for most people it is 
difficult, if not impossible, to escape the ties of nationality, religion and language. They have to 
struggle against identities chosen mostly by powerful others with all of the attendant 
                                                 
49
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JEMIE 6 (2007) 2 © 2007 by European Centre for Minority Issues 17  
psychological trauma that such a struggle involves
50
.   
 
According to Lewis,  
Despite the strength of their beliefs, Bulgarian [-speaking] Muslims  
are caught between two worlds - that of the Bulgarian Christians to  
whom they are related linguistically and that of their ethnic Turkish  
fellow Muslims. To complicate matters further, the arrival in the  
Rhodopes of Muslim teachers from Turkey, North Africa, and the   
Middle East [after 1989] gnaws away at local custom even while  
strengthening the religious identification of Bulgarian-speaking Muslims
51
.  
   
 
Some Pomaks, in an attempt to support an identity separate from both Bulgarian and Turkish, 
have resurrected myths of their own ancient origins. One such myth is that they are the 
descendants of ancient Thracians who converted to Islam during the seventh and eight centuries 
as a protection against Bulgarian attempts to Slavicize them and Byzantine attempts to 
Christianize them.  Muslim religious workers from Arab countries especially targeted the Pomak 
population during the 1990s. Under their influence another version of Pomak origins has gained 
increasing acceptance among some segments of the Pomak population. According to this version 
“the Pomaks are not Slavs and converted to Islam during the century immediately following the 
death of Prophet Mohammed”52  or they are the descendants of Syrian Arabs who were relocated 
to southeastern Europe and settled in the Rhodopes during the wars between the Byzantine 
Empire and the Caliphate during the eighth century. These scenarios contain some grains of truth. 
It was common practice by rulers of multiethnic empires, for political and/or strategic reasons, to 
relocate populations from one area of the empire to another. The Byzantines resettled Arabs from 
Syria into what is today Bulgaria and the Ottoman Empire resettled Yoruks, Tatars and 
Turkomans from Anatolia to the Balkans
53
. However, there is no evidence linking contemporary 
Pomak populations directly to Arabs, Yoruks, Tatars, Turkomans, Cumans or any other non-
Slavic group.  Nevertheless, lack of concrete evidence does not prevent a group from imagining a 
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genealogy and a history to support a claim for a particular identity.  This is especially the case for 
groups such as the Pomaks in Bulgaria where two powerful groups, the Bulgarians and the Turks, 
claim them as their own. In each of the above scenarios the Pomaks are claiming an ancestry that 
predates the history of Orthodox Bulgarians and Turkish Muslims on the Balkan Peninsula in an 
attempt to support an identity separate from both Bulgarians and Turks. Unfortunately, to the 
consternation of Pomaks, these attempts to claim a separate identity are met with ridicule by 
Bulgarians and Turks alike.    
 
After the downfall of communism in Bulgaria in late 1989 there was hope that Pomaks, along 
with other minorities, would be allowed to freely construct their own identities according to their 
own wishes. All Muslims were allowed to reclaim their Muslim names after 1989 and the new 
constitution adopted in 1991 granted all citizens broad rights regardless of ethnic, religious, and 
linguistic background (Sofia Press Agency, 1991). Unfortunately since 1989 the pressures on 
Pomaks to change or modify their ethnic and religious identity have increased. While under 
communism they had to contend only with arbitrary police coercion, today they must respond to 
assaults upon their identity from several sources -- the parliament, the Directorate of Religious 
Affairs, political parties, official and unofficial nationalist organizations, Muslim and Christian 
missionaries, various cults, Turks and Bulgarians. These outside forces are all trying to impose 
their own notions of who the Pomaks are. None of these groups are willing to accept Pomak self-
definitions of who they are.     
 
Many Pomaks have not been able to develop effective strategies to counteract these forces. They 
have reacted to the restoration of their Muslim names after 1989 with mistrust and ambivalence. 
Some have maintained the Bulgarian names imposed on them by the Ţivkov regime. Many 
Pomak women have insisted on keeping their Bulgarian names because they consider having 
Muslim names a sign of low status and a target for discrimination. Many young Pomaks have also 
chosen to keep their Bulgarian names, creating serious generational conflicts within Pomak 
families. Others have converted to Orthodox and other branches of Christianity in an attempt to 
avoid any future pressures upon their identity.   
 
Several campaigns by Bulgarian governments to assimilate Pomaks into the Bulgarian majority 
through coercive tactics have forced Pomaks to develop multiple identities to cope with changing 
circumstances. Unfortunately, most of these identities are contested by other Pomaks, by their 
Bulgarian and Turkish neighbours, by nationalist organizations, and by state authorities. The 
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unwillingness of others to take Pomak claims seriously has led to increasing confusion, 
insecurity, frustration, conflict, and alienation for many Pomaks in Bulgaria.    
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APPENDIX 
 
Table 1. Territorial Distribution of Muslims in Bulgaria: 2001 Census 
 
District    District pop.    # of Muslims    Percent 
Blagoevgrad 
Burgas 
Varna 
Veliko Tŭrnovo 
Vidin 
Vraca 
Gabrovo 
Dobrič 
Jambol 
Kŭrdţali 
Kjustendil 
Loveč 
Montana 
Pazardţik 
Pernik 
Pleven 
Plovdiv 
Razgrad 
Ruse 
Silistra 
Sliven 
Smoljan 
Sofia City 
Sofia 
Stara Zagora 
Šumen 
Tŭrgovište 
Xaskovo 
   341,173 
   423,547 
   462,013 
   293,172 
   130,074 
   243,036 
   144,125 
   215,217 
   156,070 
   164,019 
   162,534 
   169,951 
   182,258 
   310,723 
   149,832 
   311,985 
   715,816 
   152,417 
   266,157 
   142,000 
   218,874 
   140,066 
 1,170,842 
   273,240 
   370,615 
   204,378 
   137,689 
   277,478 
  
   62,431 
   64,568 
   45,672 
   26,085 
        139 
     4,223 
     8,860 
   44,277 
   13,700 
 114,217 
        231 
   10,501 
        283 
   46,338 
        178 
   15,681 
   62,595 
   81,835 
   41,997 
   54,174 
   21,668 
   58,758 
     8,614 
     3,348 
   21,423 
   72,544 
   58,838 
   33,780 
  
   18.3  
   15.2 
     9.9 
     8.9 
     0.1 
     1.7 
     6.1 
   20.6 
     8.8 
   69.6 
     0.1 
     6.2 
     0.1 
   14.9 
     0.1 
     5.0 
     8.7 
   53.7 
   15.8 
   38.1 
     9.9 
   41.9 
     0.7 
     1.0 
     5.8 
   35.5 
   42.7 
   12.2 
Totals:   7,928,901  966,978    12.2 
Source: National Statistical Institute, at www.nsi.bg/census_e/census_e.htm 
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Table 2.  Territorial Distribution of the Pomak Population around January 1, 1989 
 
Regions/ 
districts 
Total 
population 
Pomaks Regions/ 
districts 
Total 
Population 
Pomaks 
Sofia City 
Sofia 
Blagoevgrad 
Kjustendil 
Pernik 
Sofia 
Burgas 
Burgas 
Sliven 
Jambol 
Varna 
Varna 
Tolbuhin (Dobrič) 
Šumen 
Loveč  
Gabrovo 
Loveč 
Pleven 
Veliko Tŭrnovo 
1,199,405 
1,016,346 
   346,266 
   190,410 
   174,419 
   305,351 
   892,547 
   449,314 
   239,429 
   203,754 
   976,788 
   464,701 
   257,298 
   254,789 
1,079,078 
   175,120 
   202,708 
   362,130 
   339,120 
       55 
56,262 
56,191 
       14 
       16 
       41 
 3,332 
 3,330 
        2 
     -- 
  1,642 
       20 
     -- 
  1,622 
  8,933 
       28 
  8,013 
     -- 
     892 
Mihajlovgrad 
(Montana) 
Vidin 
Vraca 
Mihajlovgrad 
Plovdiv 
Pazardţik 
Plovdiv 
Smoljan 
Razgrad 
Razgrad 
Ruse 
Silistra 
Tŭrgovište 
Haskovo 
Kŭrdţali  
Stara Zagora 
Xaskovo 
 
 
   677,521 
 
   166,388 
   287,841 
   223,292 
1,244,931 
   326,315 
   754,393 
   164,223 
   847,669 
   198,007 
   304,443 
   174,052 
   171,167 
1,015,333 
   302,578 
   411,506 
   301,249 
 
 
        40 
 
     -- 
        40 
     -- 
153,484 
   29256 
    7,089 
117,139 
    6,947 
    2,897 
       865 
       210 
    2,975 
  38,276 
  30,075 
    4,141 
    4,060 
Totals    8,949,618 268,971 
Source:  After Konstantinov, Alhaug and Igla, 1991, pp.103-105.  
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